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Abstract
For a reforming government intent on improving e¢ ciency, a nat-
ural way to discriminate between alternatives is via optimal taxation.
In light of this, we examine quantitatively the extent of progressiv-
ity or regressivity of optimal labour income taxation in a model with
skill heterogeneity, endogenous skill acquisition and a production sec-
tor with capital-skill complementarity. We nd that wage inequality
driven by the resource requirements of skill-creation implies progres-
sive labour income taxation. In particular, in the steady-state, skilled
labour income is taxed about forty percent more than unskilled labour
income. We further nd that the optimal transition path from the ex-
ogenous to optimal policy steady-state also exhibits progressive labour
income taxation. These results are explained by a lower work time
elasticity for skilled versus unskilled labour which results from the
introduction of the skill acquisition technology.
Keywords: optimal progressive taxation, skill premium, allocative e¢ ciency
JEL Classication: E24, E32, E62
Corresponding author: jim.malley@glasgow.ac.uk
We would like to thank Fabrice Collard, Guido Cozzi, Pedro Gomes, Charles Nolan,
Apostolis Philippopoulos, Peter Rosenkranz, Peter Birch Sørenson, Ulrich Woitek, par-
ticipants at the Crestasee Workshop, University of Zurich, July 2014 and the CESifo
Workshop on Reforming the Public Sector, Venice, July 2014 for helpful comments and
suggestions.
1 Introduction
An important way to reform the public sector with respect to how it a¤ects
the allocation of resources is via changes to its tax policy. For a government
intent on improving e¢ ciency, a natural way to discriminate between alter-
natives is via optimal taxation, taking into consideration policy restrictions
that may apply to tax policy. Our aim in this paper is to rst characterise
the optimal tax policy in the long run, and then to analyse the optimal path
of reform from the current economy to the optimal steady-state.
The literature on optimal taxation has examined extensively the ques-
tion of the optimal progressivity of the tax system in environments with
heterogeneous agents and income inequality (see e.g. Mirrlees (1971), Di-
amond (1998), Saez (2001) and Kocherlakota (2010)). This framework is
mainly chosen to capture the key trade-o¤ underpinning the choice of op-
timal progressive taxation, namely equity versus e¢ ciency. On one hand,
equity ambitions typically prescribe progressivity of the tax system, while,
on the other hand, e¢ ciency goals are generally associated with regressive
tax structures.
In contrast to the studies referred to above, this paper examines quantita-
tively the optimal progressivity or regressivity of labour income taxation in a
model without redistributive motives. To this end we employ a representative
agent setup incorporating skill heterogeneity, capital-skill complementarity,
endogenous skill acquisition and wage inequality. Our interest in this ques-
tion is motivated by the empirical relevance of wage inequality. For example,
following reductions in earnings inequality in the U.S. for most of the 20th
century, this trend has reversed since 1980 such that the wage premium for
skilled workers is at its highest level since 1910 (see e.g. Goldin and Katz
(2008)).1 Additionally, Goldin and Katz (2008) provide historical evidence
for the 20th century demonstrating that wage inequality has developed within
a production sector characterised by capital-skill complementarity.
As discussed above, optimal progressive taxation generally follows from
equity considerations and may lead to increased e¢ ciency in the presence
of market failures. However, while we generally expect some form of re-
gressive taxation for e¢ ciency reasons, the implications of income taxation
for resource allocation ultimately depend on the structure of the underlying
economy and, in particular, on the e¤ects of taxes on the optimal reactions
of the private economic agents. Thus, in the context of the empirically rel-
evant analytical framework sketched out above, this paper concentrates on
1Given the importance of these developments, an extensive literature has studied wage
di¤erentials between college and high school graduates (see e.g. Acemoglu and Autor
(2011) Goldin and Katz (2008) and Hornstein et al. (2005) for reviews).
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the e¢ ciency incentives of optimal taxation by employing perfect capital and
labour markets to derive the Ramsey plan that minimises tax distortions.2
In light of the above, we calculate optimal factor income taxation in an
environment embodying two types of labour services (skilled and unskilled),
two types of capital (structures and equipment) and endogenous acquisition
of skill. We employ the production technology in Krusell et al. (2000) and
also used in e.g. Lindquist (2004), He and Liu (2008) and Pourpourides
(2011), since this has been shown to provide a good match to the data. This
technology species that equipment capital complements skilled labour more
than unskilled so that changes in its accumulation are skill biased.
Our analysis of skill acquisition and capital-skill complementarity builds
on and extends the model in He and Liu (2008).3 In particular, we assume
that a representative household decides how to allocate its expenditure into
investment in the two types of capital stock and into goods for creating skilled
labour. Moreover, it decides how to allocate its time endowment into leisure,
work time in skill and unskilled jobs, and in education or training for creating
skilled labour. The technology assumed for the creation of skilled hours
follows a standard Cobb-Douglas form, which allows the model to capture
the goods and time opportunity costs of creating skilled labour services. The
resource requirements associated with skill acquisition in turn imply that
there is a wage premium accruing to skilled labour to compensate for these
costs.
In other recent work, Angelopoulos et al. (2014), we analyse optimal
tax smoothing under skill heterogeneity and capital-skill complementarity,
when the government has access to state-contingent debt and a complete
set of state-contingent tax instruments. This is carried out in a stochastic
environment with endogenous and exogenous skill supply by di¤erent work-
ers, under externalities in skill creation. In contrast, our interest here is in
optimal factor return taxation in a deterministic environment with a repre-
sentative worker, without market failures, both in the long-run as well along
the transition to the Ramsey steady-state. In particular, by rst focusing on
the long-run under Ramsey policy, we examine the degree of optimal labour
income tax progressivity. Second, by calibrating the model under exogenous
2As is common in the public nance literature of Ramsey optimal taxation, the require-
ment to tax will be exogenously imposed on the government, which is assumed to have
access to a commitment technology. Additionally, since we do not allow policy makers to
have access to lump-sum policy instruments, we focus on the second-best Ramsey problem.
3The model in He and Liu (2008) provides a useful framework in which they study
policy reforms in the presence of wage inequality (see also Angelopoulos et al. (2013)).
Since our aim here is to analyse optimal policy, we modify their model to allow for an
endogenous labour-leisure choice, which is necessary when examining optimal labour taxes.
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policy to data averages for the U.S., we calculate the optimal transition paths
for policy and allocations from the exogenous policy economy to the Ramsey
steady-state.
In contrast to general expectations, when only e¢ ciency motives main-
tain, we nd that wage inequality driven by the resource requirements of
skill-creation implies progressive labour income taxation. In particular, in
the steady-state, skilled labour income is taxed about 40% more than un-
skilled labour income. We further nd that this is explained by the lower
elasticity for skilled labour relative to that of unskilled. The intuition for this
result is that the resources employed for creating skilled labour generates ad-
ditional opportunity costs for the provision of skilled labour, which act to
reduce the responsiveness of skilled work time when the tax on skilled labour
income changes. When the model is calibrated to U.S. data, these e¤ects, on
balance, lower the skilled labour elasticity relative to that for the unskilled.
Thus they create an incentive for the Ramsey planner to tax skilled labour
income more than unskilled for e¢ ciency purposes.
It should be noted that optimal progressive labour income taxation is ob-
tained in this framework in the absence of market failures. This is important
because the literature has already demonstrated that in some circumstances
progressive taxation may improve resource allocation by correcting for an
underlying market failure, thus creating e¢ ciency incentives for progressive
taxation. For instance, when lower income is related to market exclusion,
redistributive taxation may increase economic growth by increasing partici-
pation and economic performance (see e.g. Drazen (2000)).
We next consider a reform of the tax system that leaves scal expenditure
unchanged. In particular, we assume that the current policy regime is one
where tax and debt policy are constant and given by an exogenous policy
regime, calibrated to match the data averages. We then consider a change
in the policy regime, such that the government optimally chooses the time
path of taxes and debt. We nd that the Ramsey plan over the transition
period requires capital taxes to be set very high in the rst period and then
rapidly decrease towards zero, as is common in the literature on optimal
capital taxation (see e.g. Chamley (1986) and Chari and Kehoe (1999)). By
contrast, both labour income taxes turn into subsidies in the rst period, be-
fore converging to their steady-state levels. Notably, the tax system becomes
progressive from the rst period. As is also common in the optimal taxation
literature, the government runs big surpluses in the rst period. This allows
it to create a stock of assets, which is in turn used to nance primary decits
in the future. Finally, it is worth noting the Ramsey plan implies a sharp
increase in wage inequality in the rst periods, before the skill premium re-
turns e¤ectively to its initial level. However, the increase in tax progressivity
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implies that net wage inequality is reduced under Ramsey policy.
Given the realistic di¢ culty of setting capital taxes to be very high in the
very short-run and equal to zero in the long-run, we repeat the experiment
above by not letting the government choose the capital income taxes, which
are now constrained to remain xed at the pre-reform, steady-state level.
Hence, the government can choose the remaining tax/subsidies and debt to
maximise welfare for the economy, starting from the current steady-state.
We nd that the labour income taxes remain optimally progressive in this
case. However, the progressivity is lower because a lower skilled relative to
unskilled income tax, which acts to increase skilled labour supply, also works
to stimulate capital accumulation. Moreover, as the government is not able
to generate big surpluses in the rst period, because it cannot increase the
capital tax, optimal policy now implies debt, as opposed to assets, in the
long-run. Finally, wage inequality is reduced in both gross and net of tax
terms.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the
theoretical model. Section 3 rst species the functional forms used for
production, utility and skill acquisition, followed by the model calibration
and the steady-state solution under exogenous scal policy. Section 4 solves
the Ramsey model and discusses the steady-state results for optimal policy
together with the transition paths of the optimal policy instruments and
allocations. Finally, section 5 contains the conclusions.
2 The model
The economy is populated by a representative household which supplies
skilled and unskilled labour services. Following He and Liu (2008) skilled
labour requires the creation of skill, which is determined by time and goods.
There is also a representative rm that uses two types of capital and two
types of labour for the production of a homogeneous product. Following
Krusell et al. (2000), skilled labour is assumed to be more complementary to
capital equipment than unskilled labour. Thus, capital equipment accumu-
lation is skill biased and tends to increase the skill premium, dened as the
ratio of the skilled to unskilled wage. In contrast, increases in the relative
supply of skilled labour tend to reduce the skill premium. Since provision of
skilled labour comes at a cost to the household, a wage premium for skilled
labour is required in equilibrium to maintain net wage parity. Finally, the
government nances exogenous public spending by issuing debt, taxing all
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sources of income and subsidising investment in skill acquisition.4
2.1 The representative household
2.1.1 Utility
The lifetime utility of the representative household is given by:
U =
1X
t=0
tu(Ct; lt) (1)
where 0 <  < 1 is a constant discount factor and denotes the time preference
of the individual; Ct and lt are consumption and leisure respectively at period
t; and u() is increasing in its arguments, strictly concave and three times
continuously di¤erentiable.
2.1.2 Constraints
The representative household faces the following time constraint:
1 = lt + h
s
t + h
u
t + et (2)
where hst and h
u
t denote skilled and unskilled labour work time respectively
in period t and et is time devoted to education or other training for skills
acquisition in period t.
The skill acquisition function is given by:
hst = g(E
g
t ; et) (3)
where Egt is expenditure on creating skills, and g(:) is increasing in its argu-
ments, strictly concave and three times continuously di¤erentiable.
The law of motion for the two types of capital stock , i 2 fp; eg, where p
and e denote plant and equipment capital respectively, is given by:
Kit+1 = (1  i)Kit + I it . (4)
4Given that we extend the benchmark neoclassical model to isolate the importance
of capital-skill complementarity and skill-acquisition for optimal taxation, we retain the
remaining modelling assumptions of the base model analysed in the literature following
Chari et al. (1994). Therefore, we assume perfect competition in product and labour
markets, do not consider the potential role of government tax and spending policies in
the form of providing public goods and/or correcting for other market failures and choose
functional forms for utility, skill-acquisition and production that are commonly employed
in the dynamic general equilibrium tax literature.
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The depreciation rate is denoted 0  i  1 and Ii;t is the investment in
period t.
Finally, the household has the following budget constraint equating total
expenditure with total income in period t:
Ct + I
p
t + I
e
t + (1  sgt )Egt + bt+1Rbt = (1  
s
t )w
s
th
s
t+
+(1  ut )wut hut + (1   pt )rptKpt + (1   et )retKet + bt
(5)
where, bt+1
Rbt
is the discounted value of bonds bought by the household at start
of period t; Rbt 
 
1 + rbt

is the gross return to bonds; bt is the payout value
of bonds bought at period t   1; sgt is a subsidy for spending on goods for
skill acquisition;  st ; 
u
t ; 
p
t and 
e
t are the tax rates on skilled and unskilled
labour income as well as plant and equipment capital income in period t
respectively.
2.1.3 First-order conditions
Using equation (4) for i 2 fp; eg to substitute out plant and equipment
investment, the Lagrangian for the household problem is:
L = max
1X
j=0
ju(Ct+j; lt+j) + t+jfCt+j +Kpt+j+1  (6)
  (1  p)Kpt+j +Ket+j+1   (1  e)Ket+j + (1  sgt )Egt+
+
bt+j+1
Rbt+j
  (1   st+j)wst+jhst+j   (1  ut+j)wut+ijhut+j 
  (1   pt+j)rpt+jKpt+j   [(1   et+j)ret+j]Ket+j   bt+jg+
+Mt+j[h
s
t   g(Egt+j; et+j)]
where from the time constraint, lt+j = 1  hst+j   hut+j   et+j: The represen-
tative household chooses fCt; hst ; hut ; et; Egt ; Kpt+1; Ket+1; bt+1g1t=0 given prices
and taxes to maximize equation (6) which gives respectively the following
rst-order conditions (FOCs):
UCt =  t (7)
Uhst = t(1   st )wst  Mt (8)
Uhut = t(1  ut )wut (9)
Uet =Mtget (10)
gEgt =
t
Mt
(1  sgt ) (11)
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t = 

t+1

rpt+1(1   pt+1) + (1  p)
	
(12)
t = 

t+1

(ret+1(1   et+1) + (1  e)
	
(13)
t = t+1R
b
t (14)
where Ux and gx are the derivatives of the utility and skill accumulation func-
tions with respect to the relevant variable denoted generically as x; and t
and Mt are the Langrange multipliers associated with the budget constraint
and the skill acquisition equation, respectively.
These equilibrium conditions imply rst, that the marginal utility of con-
sumption, UCt, is equal to the shadow price of the budget constraint, t which
measures the change in maximised utility, when the constraint is relaxed by a
unit. Second, the marginal disutility of skilled/unskilled work time, Uhst and
Uhut , are equal to the net of tax return to skilled/unskilled work, (1   st )wst
and (1   u)wut respectively valued by the shadow price, t. Additionally,
the return to skilled work is also net of the shadow price, Mt, of the skilled
employment constraint, capturing the valuation, in utility terms, of the cost
of creating skill. Third, the marginal disutility of education, Uet, is equal to
the marginal increase in skilled employment due to a unit increase in educa-
tion time, get, valued by the shadow price,Mt. Fourth, the marginal increase
in skilled employment for a unit increase in goods expenditure, gEgt , is equal
to the ratio of shadow prices, t
Mt
, net of the subsidy to goods invested to
create skill, (1  sgt ). Finally the last three conditions, equate the marginal
utility of consumption in period t, t, with discounted marginal utility of
consumption in period t+ 1, t+1, which includes the consumption due to
saving in plant/equipment capital net of taxes and depreciation, and bonds.
By combining equation (8) with equation (9), and noting that Uhst = Uhut ,
we see that the return to skilled labour net of tax and the cost for skill
acquisition, must equal in equilibrium, the net of tax return to unskilled
labour:
(1   st )wst  
Mt
t
= (1  ut )wut . (15)
In other words, wage parity requires that the net returns to an hour in either
skilled or unskilled labour are equalised. Therefore, in an economy without
market failures, the skill premium is the compensation to skilled labour for
the opportunity cost of acquiring skills.
We next substitute the condition relating to the return to bonds (14) into
equations (12) and (13) to obtain:
Rbt = r
p
t+1(1   pt+1) + (1  p) (16)
Rbt = r
e
t+1(1   et+1) + (1  e). (17)
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These dene the no-arbitrage conditions for capital and bonds ensuring that
the three assets have the same rate of return in equilibrium. Finally, the
following transversality conditions for i 2 fp; eg, excluding Ponzi games,
must hold for the economy to reach a stationary equilibrium (see also e.g.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2011, ch. 16) on transversality conditions with
government debt):
lim
t!1
tUCt
bt+1
Rbt
= 0 (18)
lim
t!1
tUCtK
i
t+1 = 0. (19)
2.2 The representative rm
The representative rm produces a homogeneous consumption good, Yt, using
skilled, ehst , and unskilled, ehut , labour as well as plant, eKpt , and equipment,eKet , capital. Acting in perfectly competitive factor markets, taking prices,
policy and exogenous variables as given, the rm maximises its prots, t:
max tehst ;ehut ; eKpt ; eKet = Yt   w
s
t
ehst   wut ehut   rpt eKpt   ret eKet (20)
subject to a Krusell et al. (2000) type production function:
Yt = f
ehst ;ehut ; eKpt ; eKet  (21)
where f() is homogenous of degree one; a tilde over a variable denotes rm
quantities; wst and w
u
t are the returns to skilled and unskilled labour respec-
tively; and ret and r
p
t are the returns to capital holdings in equipment and
structures respectively.
Choosing the optimal amount of hours of skilled and unskilled labour to
hire and the optimal quantity of plant and equipment capital to rent yields
the following rst-order conditions:
wst   fehst = 0 (22)
wut   fehut = 0 (23)
rpt   f eKpt = 0 (24)
ret   f eKet = 0 (25)
equating the returns on each factor to their respective marginal products.
Given the structure employed, prots are zero in equilibrium.
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2.3 Government budget constraint
The governments budget constraint in each period is:
Gc + sgtE
g
t + bt = 
s
t w
s
th
s
t + 
u
t w
u
t h
u
t + 
p
t r
p
tK
p
t + 
e
t r
e
tK
e
t +
bt+1
Rbt
(26)
and states that expenditure on public consumption, Gc, the subsidy to spend-
ing on education and repayments on existing debt (issued at the start of
period t   1) must be equal to the revenues from taxing labour and capital
income plus the discounted value of new debt issued at the start of period t.
2.4 Market clearing conditions
Output can be used for public and private consumption, plant and equipment
investment as well as goods spending to acquire skills, implying the following
aggregate resource constraint:
Yt = G
c + Ct + I
p
t + I
e
t + E
g
t : (27)
Additionally, the market clearing conditions in the capital and labour mar-
kets are given by: eKpt = Kpt (28)eKet = Ket (29)ehst = hst (30)ehut = hut : (31)
2.5 Decentralised competitive equilibrium
The decentralised competitive equilibrium (DCE) with exogenous policy is
summarized by a sequence of allocations fCt; hst ; hut ; et; Egt ; Kpt+1; Ket+1;ehst ;ehut ;eKpt ; eKet g1t=0, the residual policy instrument fbt+1g1t=0 and prices fwst ; wut ; rpt ;
retg1t=0 such that the representative household solves its optimisation problem
and the rm maximises prots, taking prices, tax rates, initial conditions for
capital and debt, and xed Gc as given; the government budget constraint is
satised and all markets clear. The DCE system is presented in the Appen-
dix, see equations (58)-(69).
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3 Quantitative analysis exogenous policy
In this section we rst specify the functional forms for production, utility
and skill acquisition. We then calibrate the exogenous policy model using
annual U.S. data for the period 1970-2011 and solve for the steady-state.
3.1 Functional forms
The production function follows the CES form as in Krusell et al. (2000):
Yt= A
 eKpt  f h Ae eKet  + (1  )ehsti'=+
+(1  )
ehut ' g 1 a' (32)
where,  1 < ';  < 1; 0 < a; ;  < 1: The parameters ' and  determine
the factor elasticities, i.e. 1=(1  ') is the elasticity of substitution between
equipment capital and unskilled labour and between skilled and unskilled
labour. The elasticity of substitution between equipment capital and skilled
labour is given by 1=(1 ).5 The parameters a; ;  denote the factor shares
and nally, A > 0 and Ae > 0 are the total factor productivity and capital
equipment augmenting technology parameters respectively.
The utility function follows the CRRA form in Chari et al. (1994):
u(Ct; lt) =
 
Ct l
1 
t
1 
1   (33)
where (; ) > 0 represent the preference parameters of the representative
household. Specically,  determines the weight given to consumption, and
 is the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient.
Finally, the skill acquisition equation is a variant of the form used in He
and Liu (2008):
hst = g(E
g
t ; et) = S
h
(Egt )
 (et)
1 
i
(34)
where the shares of goods and time in the creation of skills are given by 
and 1  respectively, with 0 <  < 1. The parameter S > 0 determines the
e¢ ciency of the skill-creation process. Finally, 0 <  < 1 is a measure of the
returns to scale and is positive but less than unity to ensure that the model
has a unique solution (see, e.g. He and Liu (2008)).
5Note that capital-skill complementarity maintains if 1=(1  ) < 1=(1  ').
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3.2 Calibration and steady-state
We calibrate the model under exogenous scal policy to target the key great-
ratios using U.S. annual data for the period 1970-2011. Table 2.1 below
reports the models quantitative parameters and Table 5 in the Appendix the
sources for the data used for the calibration and referred to below. Starting
with the share of leisure in utility, (1   ), we calibrate it to 0:65 so that,
in the steady-state, the household devotes about one third of its time to
labour and education. The relative risk aversion parameter,  = 2, is set to
the value commonly employed in the literature (see, e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2007) and the references reported in their paper).
Table 1: Calibration
Denitions Values
p depreciation rate of capital structures 0.080
e depreciation rate of capital equipment 0.100
 time discount factor 0.960
 weight attached to consumption in utility 0.350
 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion 2.000
 weight on goods investment for skill acquisition 0.550
S e¢ ciency of skills production 1.000
 returns to scale in skill creation 0.424
 income share of capital structures 0.120
1
1  capital equipment to skilled labour elasticity 0.670
1
1 ' capital equipment to unskilled labour elasticity 1.670
 share of composite input to output 0.700
 share of capital equipment to composite input 0.470
 s skilled labour income tax rate 0.250
u unskilled labour income tax rate 0.200
 p tax rate on capital structures income 0.310
 e tax rate on capital equipment income 0.310
sg subsidy for goods investment in skill acquisition 0.000
A total factor productivity 1.000
Ae capital equipment productivity 1.000
The elasticities of substitution between skilled labour and capital and be-
tween unskilled labour and capital (or skilled labour) have been estimated
by Krusell et al. (2000). Following the literature (see e.g. Lindquist (2004),
and Pourpourides (2011)), we also use these estimates, to set ' = 0:401
and  =  0:495. Moreover, the income share of capital structures, a, is set
to 0.12, as in Lindquist (2004). The remaining parameters in the produc-
tion function are calibrated to ensure that the steady-state predictions of the
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model in asset and labour markets are consistent with the data. More specif-
ically, the unskilled labour weight in composite input share, (1  ) = 0:3,
is calibrated to obtain a skilled to unskilled labour ratio of about 79% (see
Acemoglu and Autor (2011)) and the capital equipment weight share in com-
posite input,  = 0:47, is set to obtain a skill premium of approximately 1:64
using U.S. Census data We also normalize the steady-state values of TFP
and capital equipment e¢ ciency to unity (i.e. A = Ae = 1).
The depreciation rates of capital structures and capital equipment, p =
0:08 and e = 0:1, are calibrated to obtain an annual capital to output ratio
of about 1:94, which is consistent with the annual data reported by the BEA
on capital stocks. These values are also in line with the works of Greenwood
et al. (1997) and Krusell et al. (2000). The time discount factor,  = 0:96,
is set to obtain a post-tax post-depreciation annual real rate of return on
capital of roughly 4:17%, which coheres with the value of 4:19% obtained
from the World Bank.
The returns to scale parameter, , in the skill acquisition equation is
calibrated to be equal to 0.425, to obtain an investment in education to
output ratio of about 1.8% which is similar to the average private expenditure
on education in the U.S. using data from the Digest of Education Statistics.
The weight on education time, 1   , is set equal to 0.45 to target average
time in education as a share of total non-leisure time of about 5%.6 The
e¢ ciency of skills transformation, B, is normalised to unity.7
Finally, we follow the methodology in Martinez-Mongay (2000) and data
from OECD and AMECO to construct series on e¤ective capital and labour
tax rates and obtain an average tax rate for capital and labour. Therefore,
we set the tax rate for both capital income  p =  e = 0:31 and the two
labour income tax rates u = 0:20 and  s = 0:25.8 Given that it is di¢ cult
to obtain data for the education investment subsidy, sg, we set it to zero
under the exogenous scal policy. We nally set the value of government
expenditures, Gc = 0:0320, to obtain a steady-state debt to output ratio,
b=Y = 53%, which is equal to the average debt to GDP ratio obtained using
6To obtain this value we assume that the total time spent in higher education is on
average 4 years. Note that the average years of working is 35. Therefore, the percentage
of time spent in education is 435 = 0:1143. Taking into account that on average, 40-45% of
the overall population in the U.S. are college educated using data from the Census Bureau,
we obtain: 435  0:45 = 0:0514.
7Note that the parameters in the skill acquisition equation are within the range sug-
gested in the related literature (i.e. Heckman (1976) and Stokey (1996)).
8Note that the calculation of the e¤ective labour income tax rate is equal to 0.22.
But since we assume that the skilled and unskilled labour income is taxed di¤erently
we decompose the labour income tax into skilled and unskilled tax so that the weighted
average of the two tax rates equals 0.22.
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data from FRED.
Table 2: Steady-state
model data
C=Y 0.563 0.660
K=Y 1.945 1.895
I=Y 0.181 0.146
Eg=Y 0.018 0.021
b=Y 0.530 0.530
hs=hu 0.798 0.763
Gc=Y 0.238 0.203
ws=wu 1.640 1.640
ws=wu 1.538 1.538
r 0.042 0.042
e
hs+hu+e
0.053 0.051
Under exogenous scal policy we solve the decentralized competitive equi-
librium system of equations (58)-(69) in the Appendix keeping the tax rates
at their calibrated values in Table 1. Table 2 presents the steady-state results
of the exogenous scal policy model together with the U.S. data averages for
1970-2011 (see Table 5 in the Appendix the sources for the data).
The steady-state presented in table 2 conrms that the model is close to
the data as described above.9
4 Optimal scal policy
In this section we derive the optimal Ramsey plan, where it is assumed that
the government chooses the series of taxes, subsidies and debt to nance ex-
ogenously determined public spending, with the objective to maximise the
welfare of the household.10 The government, in other words, wishes to min-
imise the welfare costs of taxation. To obtain the second-best allocations,
it is assumed that the government has access to a commitment technology.
To solve the Ramsey problem we use the primal approach and rst derive
the present discounted value (PDV) of the households lifetime budget con-
straint making use of the no-arbitrage and transversality conditions for the
9Note that the barred values in Table 2 are dened as follows: ws = (1   s)ws,
wu = (1  u)wu and r =  1   i ri +  1  i = Rb; where i = s; u.
10Note that following the optimal tax policy literature, we keep the level of Gc xed over
time to the value obtained under exogenous scal policy. Note also that the subsidy to
skill creation expenditure is added to ensure that all margins relating to the households
decision making are taxed/subsidised, implying that the tax instrument set is complete
(see e.g. Chari and Kehoe (1999)).
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three assets as well as the Arrow-Debreu price of the bond. Second, we de-
rive the implementability constraint by substituting out prices and tax rates
from the households PDV budget constraint using the households and rms
rst-order conditions. Finally, we derive the optimal Ramsey plan by max-
imising the planners objective function subject to the implementability, skill
acquisition and aggregate resource constraint.
4.1 Implementability constraint
Summing the households budget constraint (5) successively forward from
t = 0 to t = 1 and imposing the no-arbitrage (16)-(17) and transversality
conditions (18)-(19) gives the households PDV or lifetime budget constraint:
1P
t=0

t 1Q
i=0
 
Rbi
 1
[Ct + (1  sgt )Egt ] =
1P
t=0

t 1Q
i=0
 
Rbi
 1
f(1   st )wsthst + (1  ut )wut hut g+ b0 + f(1   p0 )rp0+
+(1  p)gKp0 + f(1   e0 )re0 + (1  e)gKe0 :
(35)
Following Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012), the Arrow-Debreu price is de-
ned as: q0t =
t 1Q
i=0
 
Rbi
 1
, 8t  1, with q00 = 1, which implies that equation
(35) can be rewritten as:
1P
t=0
q0t [Ct + (1  sgt )Egt ] =
1P
t=0
q0t f(1   st )wsthst + (1  ut )wut hut g+
+b0 + f(1   p0 )rp0 + (1  p)gKp0 + f(1   e0 )re0 + (1  e)gKe0 .
(36)
Notice that the Arrow-Debreu price satises the recursion:
q0t+1 =
 
Rbt
 1
q0t . (37)
Using the rst-order conditions (7) and (14), the above recursion can be
written as:
q0t+1 = 
t+1UCt+1
UC0
) q0t = t
UCt
UC0
. (38)
Substituting: (i) equation (38) into equation (36) for q0t ; (ii) the rst-order
conditions of the rm, (24)-(25) into equation (36) for rp0 and r
e
0 respectively;
and (iii) the rst-order conditions of the household, (7)(11) into equation
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(36) for (1   st )wst , (1   ut )wut and (1  sgt ) gives the households imple-
mentability constraint:
1X
t=0
t

UCtCt  

Uet
get
gEgt

Egt +

Uhst +
Uet
get

hst + Uhut h
u
t

= A0 (39)
where, A0= UC0fb0+

(1   p0 )fKp0 + 1  p

Kp0+

(1   e0 )fKe0 + 1  e

Ke0 .
Note that fKp0 and fKe0 are obtained by substituting the market clearing
conditions (28)-(29) into f eKpt and f eKet respectively.
4.2 The primal approach
Under the primal approach the government maximises the following objective
function:
max
1X
t=0
tU (Ct; lt) (40)
subject to the skill acquisition (3), the aggregate resource (27) and the imple-
mentability (39) constraints by choosing: fCt; hst ; hut ; et; Egt ; Kpt+1; Ket+1g1t=0
given f p0 ;  e0 ; b0; Kp0 ; Ke0g.11 Following Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012) we de-
ne a pseudo-value function and assume that  is the Lagrange multiplier
with respect to the implementability constraint:
V (Ct; hs;t; hu;t; et; ) = U (Ct; lt) + fUCtCt 
 

Uet
get
gEgt

Egt +

Uhst +
Uet
get

hst + Uhut h
u
t g: (41)
We can then write the Lagrangian under the primal approach as:
J =
1X
t=0
tV (Ct; hs;t; hu;t; et; ) + t[Yt  Gct   Ct   Egt  Kpt+1+ (42)
+ (1  p)Kpt  Ket+1 + (1  e)Ket ] + t [hst   g(Egt ; et)]  A0
where Yt is given by equation (32) above and t; t  0 8t, are sequences
of Lagrange multipliers with respect to the aggregate resource constraint
and the skill acquisition constraint respectively. Given the initial values of
capital taxes, debt and the two stocks of capital, equation J is maximised
with respect to fCt; hst ; hut ; et; Egt ; Kpt+1; Ket+1g1t=1 and for t = 0 equation J is
maximised with respect to fC0; hs0; hu0 ; e0; Ig0g yielding the following rst-order
conditions respectively:
VCt = t; t  1 (43)
11Following the literature, we do not examine the problem of initial capital taxation and
thus not allow the government to optimally choose the capital income taxes at t = 0.
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Vhst =  tYhst   t; t  1 (44)
Vhut =  tYhut ; t  1 (45)
Vet = tget ; t  1 (46)
VEgt = t + tgE
g
t
; t  0 (47)
t = t+1
h
YKpt+1 + 1  p
i
; t  0 (48)
t = t+1
h
YKet+1 + 1  e
i
; t  0 (49)
VC0 = 0 + AC (50)
Vhs0 =  0Yhs0   0 + Ahs (51)
Vhu0 =  0Yhu0 + Ahu (52)
Ve0 = 0ge0 + Ae (53)
where Yx;t is the derivative of Yt, given by equation (32), with respect to the
relevant variable x at time t.
The above system of rst-order conditions implies that the system to be
solved will be di¤erent for t = 0 and t = 1; 2; 3:::T   1 and t = T . This
is reected in equations (70)-(93) reported in the Appendix. To solve this
system, we initially guess a value for  and solve equations (70)-(93) for an al-
location fCt; hst ; hut ; et; Egt ; t; Kpt+1; Ket+1g1t=0.12 The system has [(8 T ) + 1]
equations and is solved using standard non-linear numerical methods (see,
e.g. Garcia-Milà et al. (2010) and Adjemian et al. (2011)). Then we test if
the implementability constraint (39) is binding and we increase or decrease
accordingly the value of  until the implementability constraint is satised.
We set the initial conditions for debt, the two stocks of capital and the two
capital income taxes equal to their exogenous steady-state, to calculate the
dynamic transition path from the exogenous to optimal scal policy steady-
state. To ensure that the variables converge to the optimal scal policy
steady-state, we set the value of T = 250. The results indicate that model
convergence is achieved after 150 periods.
4.3 Optimal allocations and policy
We rst analyse the steady-state under optimal policy and compare outcomes
with the current economy. We then evaluate the transition paths that the
policymaker would choose if, starting from the current economy, economic
policy was chosen optimally by working as described in the previous subsec-
tion.
12Note that the multiplier t has been substituted out of the system presented in the
Appendix.
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4.3.1 Ramsey policy in the steady-state
In table 3, we present the Ramsey optimal resource allocations and policy
choices in the steady-state. Table 3 also includes the steady-state outcomes
of the economy under exogenous policy that is calibrated to the data averages
as explained in the previous section. The rst result which can be conrmed
in table 3 is that, consistent with the literature on optimal taxation (see
e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, ch. 16) for a review), capital taxes are
zero in the long-run, for both capital stocks.13 In contrast, labour income
taxes, are positive and, in fact, signicantly more progressive compared with
the calibrated economy under exogenous policy. In particular, in the steady-
state, skilled labour income is taxed about 40% more than unskilled labour
income. The tax revenue generated by these taxes, in addition to the revenue
from the assets that the government holds optimally in the steady-state,
nance the exogenous stream of public spending as well as optimal subsidies
to skill acquisition expenditure.
Table 3: Exogenous and Ramsey steady-states
Exogenous Ramsey Exogenous Ramsey
policy policy policy policy
Y 0.134 0.169 ws=wu 1.538 1.456
C 0.076 0.090  p 0.310 0.000
Kp 0.091 0.167  e 0.310 0.000
Ke 0.170 0.289  s 0.250 0.318
hs 0.118 0.135 u 0.200 0.233
hu 0.148 0.133 sg 0.000 0.451
e 0.015 0.014 b=Y 0.530 -0.475
Eg 0.002 0.005 U -76.438 -75.010
ws=wu 1.640 1.638  - 5.243%
The optimal allocations in turn reect the changes in the policy instru-
ments compared with the calibrated economy under exogenous policy. In
particular, capital accumulation increases, following the elimination of the
capital taxes. The rise in skill-biased capital stock tends to increase the skill
13As is well known in the literature of optimal taxation, the optimal zero capital tax
result is a special case applying only to the asymptotic steady state, under specic assump-
tions in the neoclassical model and is very sensitive to a number of realistic extensions that
allow for various forms of market and/or policy failures (see, e.g. Guo and Lansing (1999),
Correia (1996), Klein et al. (2008), Lansing (1999), Conesa et al. (2009)). Given that the
optimal capital tax has been the focus of an extensive literature, we do not pursue this
further here and focus instead on labour income taxes under capital-skill complementarity
and skill-acquisition.
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premium, which acts to raise the relative skill supply. The latter is further
supported by the subsidy to skill acquisition expenditure. As a result, the
relative skill supply increases, so that the skill premium under Ramsey policy
is e¤ectively the same as the skill premium under exogenous policy. However,
the increase in the progressivity of labour income taxation implies that wage
inequality, as captured by the skill premium net of taxes, is reduced. Overall,
optimal policy reduces the distortions associated with the tax system. This
is evident by the increase in output and consumption under Ramsey policy
and by the welfare gains, in terms of consumption, obtained by moving from
exogenous to optimal policy. In particular, the welfare gains measured by
the compensating consumption supplement,  , are roughly 5.2%.14
4.3.2 Optimal progressive labour income taxes
The most striking result regarding optimal policy in table 3 is that the labour
income taxes should optimally be progressive. What makes this result no-
table is that it is obtained in an economy without market failures and without
redistribution incentives for the policymaker.15 To understand this nding,
we start by considering the main principle of Ramsey taxation, which sug-
gests that, to minimise e¢ ciency distortions, taxes should be higher for more
inelastic tax bases.16 Our nding, that skilled labour income should be taxed
more than unskilled, is consistent with this principle, since we nd that skilled
work time is more inelastic than unskilled work time. To demonstrate this, in
gure 1 we plot the percent deviations for hs and hu from their steady-state
under exogenous policy in table 3, after a permanent 1% change in either  s
(solid lines) or u (dashed lines). Subplots (1,1) and (1,2) respectively show
the elasticities of skilled and unskilled work time and the elasticities of skilled
and unskilled labour income with respect to the tax rates. As can be seen,
skilled work time and income are more inelastic with respect to the relevant
income tax rate, compared with unskilled work time and labour income. Ac-
14The welfare gains are obtained as the compensating consumption supplement that
would make the economy under exogenous policy as well o¤ as the economy under optimal
policy.
15Note that optimal labour income progressivity is not driven by the subsidy to expen-
diture on skill acquisition, although the latter does a¤ect its magnitude. In particular, if
we restrict the government from having access to this policy instrument,  s is still higher
than u, but the di¤erence is smaller.
16The importance of the elasticities for labour income tax progressivity has been high-
lighted in the recent optimal taxation literature (see e.g. Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001)).
These studies also demonstrate the importance of the shape of the income (or skills) dis-
tribution and of the social weights in the objective function of the planner in setups with
heterogeneous households.
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cordingly, the policymaker nds it optimal to tax skilled labour income more
than unskilled, so that labour income taxation is progressive.
[Figure 1 here]
Note that in this economy, the opportunity cost of skilled work time is
foregone: (i) utility-augmenting leisure; (ii) income from unskilled work time;
and (iii) income due to higher education expenditure to compensate for the
loss in education time required for skill creation (see 15)). Therefore, the
elasticity of skilled work time with respect to the tax rate is a¤ected by
channels that operate via unskilled work time and skill acquisition, in addi-
tion to usual substitution and income e¤ects. To illustrate the importance
of these channels and explain how they a¤ect the skilled work time elastic-
ity, relative to unskilled work time elasticity, we next further investigate the
factors that determine the elasticities in our setup.
The elasticity of skill supply with respect to the tax rate on skilled labour
income is dened as s  dhst
dst
st
hst
. Using the households optimality conditions
and the functional forms for the utility function assumed above, we have:
hst = 1  hut   et  
h
(1  ) + (1 )
get
i
Ct
(1   st )wst
(54)
which implies that the total derivative dh
s
t
dst
is given by:
dhst
dst
=
@hst
@st
+
@hst
@Ct
dCt
dst
+
@hst
@wst
dwst
dst
+
@hst
@hut
dhut
dst
+
@hst
@Egt
dEgt
dst
+
@hst
@et
det
dst
=   (1 )
h
1+ 1
get
i
wst (1 st )
h
Ct
(1 st ) +
dCt
dst
  Ct
wst
dwst
dst
i
 
 dhut
dst
+
(1 )
(get )
2CtgetE
g
t
(1 st )wst
dEgt
dst
+
"
(1 )
(get )
2Ctgetet
(1 st )wst   1
#
det
dst
(55)
where get > 0, getet < 0 and getEgt > 0 denote the respective rst-partial,
second-partial and cross-partial derivatives of the skill acquisition function.
The elasticity of unskilled work time with respect to the tax rate on
unskilled labour income is dened as u  dhut
dut
ut
hut
. Using the households op-
timality conditions and the functional forms for the utility function assumed
above, we have:
hut = 1  hst  
(1  )Ct
(1  ut )wut
(56)
which implies that the total derivative dh
u
t
dut
is given by:
dhut
dut
=
@hut
@ut
+
@hut
@Ct
dCt
dut
+
@hut
@wut
dwut
dut
+
@hut
@hst
dhst
dut
=   (1 )Ct
wut (1 ut )2  
(1 )
(1 ut )wut
dCt
dut
+ (1 )Ct
(1 ut )(wut )2
dwut
dut
  dhst
dut
.
(57)
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Equation (55) shows that there are six terms determining the responsive-
ness of skilled work time to the tax rate on skilled labour income. These
terms incorporate the following marginal e¤ects of  st :
dhst
dst
, dCt
dst
, dw
s
t
dst
, dh
u
t
dst
, dE
g
t
dst
and det
dst
. To facilitate the analysis we plot these derivatives in gure 2 for a
permanent 1% increase in  st .
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[Figure 2 here]
With the aid of gure 2 we can sign the e¤ect of each term in (55) on dh
s
t
dst
.
These include the:
(i) substitution e¤ect:   (1 )
h
1+ 1
get
i
Ct
wst (1 st )2 < 0, capturing the reduction in the
net return to an hour of work, due to a higher  st , which tends to
decrease hst ;
(ii) consumption (income) e¤ect:   (1 )
h
1+ 1
get
i
(1 st )wst
dCt
dst
> 0, since dCt
dst
< 0 (see
subplot (1,2)), capturing the reduction in consumption, due to a higher
 st , which tends to increase h
s
t to compensate for the loss in income;
(iii) wage e¤ect:
(1 )
h
1+ 1
get
i
Ct
(1 st )(wst )2
dwst
dst
> 0, since dw
s
t
dst
> 0 (see subplot (2,1)),
capturing the higher gross equilibrium wage rate, due to the higher  st ,
which tends to increase hst ;
(iv) cross-work time e¤ect:  dhut
dst
< 0, since dh
u
t
dst
> 0 (see subplot (2,2)),
capturing the increase in the supply of unskilled labour, due the fall in
the return of skilled relative to unskilled labour, which tends to decrease
hst .
(v) resource allocation e¤ect from Egt :
(1 )
(get )
2CtgetE
g
t
(1 st )wst
dEgt
dst
< 0, since dE
g
t
dst
< 0
(see subplot (3,1)), capturing the reduction in expenditure for skill
acquisition, due to the fall in the net return to skilled labour, which
tends to decrease hst because of the increase in disposable income;
(vi) resource allocation e¤ect from et:
"
(1 )
(get )
2Ctgetet
(1 st )wst   1
#
det
dst
> 0 since det
dst
<
0 (see subplot (3,2)), capturing the reduction in education time for skill
acquisition, due to the fall in the net return to skilled labour, which
tends to increase hst since there is more time available to work.
17Note that the derivatives for a permanent 1% increase in ut are also plotted in Figure
2 to help sign deriviative terms in (57).
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To understand why the response of skilled labour to a tax change is
smaller than that of unskilled labour, i.e. jsj < juj, we next consider the
elasticity of unskilled work time with respect to the tax rate on unskilled
labour income in (57). In particular, note that the two resource allocation
e¤ects from skill creation, i.e. (v) and (vi) are absent from the total derivative
expression for unskilled work time. Referring to gure 1, it can be seen that
the total e¤ect on unskilled work time in the presence of e¤ects (i)-(iv) only
is strongly negative. Figure 2 also conrms that each of the derivatives in
equation (57) has the same signs as the respective derivatives in the skilled
labour elasticity equation (55). Hence, it appears that the additional e¤ects
associated with skill creation in equation (55) play an important role in
decreasing jsj relative to juj, since the positive resource allocation e¤ect
from et dominates that from E
g
t .
4.3.3 Optimal transition paths
We next consider a reform of the tax system that leaves scal expenditure
unchanged. In particular, we assume that the current policy regime is one
where tax and debt policy are constant and given by an exogenous policy
regime, calibrated to match the data averages. We then consider a change
in the policy regime, such that the government optimally chooses the time
path of taxes and debt. We therefore examine the optimal transition of the
economy from the steady-state of exogenous policy, as summarised in table
3, to the optimal steady-state under Ramsey policy in the same table. We
plot the optimal transition paths for the policy instruments and the economic
allocations in gure 3.
[Figure 3 here]
Consistent with the analysis of optimal capital income taxes (see e.g.
Chamley (1986) and Chari et al. (1994)), the capital taxes,  pt and 
e
t , are
set very high in the rst period, switch to zero in the second period and
remain at this level. This tax policy allows the government to generate high
tax revenue in the rst period, accumulate assets by lending to the household
and thus generate a stream of revenue from the returns to these assets in the
future (see path of bt=Yt). The pattern of the capital tax rates is reected
on the dynamics of the capital stocks, Kpt and K
e
t , which initially decrease
and then increase. In turn, these dynamics inuence the movements of the
wage rates, since the marginal products of labour are positive functions of
the capital stocks. However, given the skill-biased role of equipment capital,
the skill premium, wst=w
u
t , increases initially, before returning e¤ectively, in
the long-run, to its original steady-state.
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The initial rise in capital taxes (and fall in capital stocks) is met by a
reduction in both labour income taxes,  st and 
u
t , (which become subsidies in
the rst period) and a subsidy to skill expenditure, sgt , which help to increase
work time, hst and h
u
t , despite the fall in marginal labour productivity. This
policy mediates the negative e¤ects on the economy in the very short-run
brought about by the capital tax and capital stock movements. Both labour
income taxes return to positive magnitudes after the rst period, but it is
interesting to note that the labour tax system is optimally progressive from
the rst period onwards. This progressivity in turn works to reduce post-tax
wage inequality, wst=w
u
t .
Note that the response of skilled labour hours to optimal policy is much
smoother than the response of unskilled labour hours, despite the higher
volatility in the skilled wage rate compared with that of the unskilled. This
is consistent with a more inelastic skilled work time, as discussed above.
Moreover, it is consistent with empirical evidence which suggests that in the
U.S., over 1979-2002, the standard deviation of unskilled labour hours was on
average 1.3 times higher than the standard deviation of skilled labour hours,
despite the standard deviation of the skilled wage being 1.2 times higher
than the standard deviation of the unskilled wage.18 A more inelastic skill
labour supply is further supported by evidence from Blau and Khan (2007)
and Kimball and Shapiro (2008), who nd that workers with a college degree
have lower labour supply elasticity compared with workers with some or no
college education.
Optimal policy leads to a more e¢ cient economy with higher output, Yt,
and consumption, Ct. Hence, the implicit relative cost of goods versus time in
creating skill is lower for the Ramsey planner, relative to the exogenous policy
case. This, in turn, results in a subsidy for skill acquisition expenditure,
making it cheaper for the household to use goods relative to time when
creating skill, and this is reected in the movements of education time, et,
and skill expenditure, Egt , which decrease and increase respectively.
4.4 Non-zero capital taxes
We next consider the e¤ects on optimal labour income taxation and opti-
mal allocations when the tax rates on plant and equipment capital are held
constant at their data average values. This is motivated by the di¢ culty, in
practice, of setting capital taxes to be very high in the short-run and equal
to zero in the long-run, which is what the Ramsey plan dictates. Therefore,
18These statistics are obtained using the quarterly data on skilled and unskilled hours
and wages in Lindquist (2004). We thank Matthew Lindquist for making these series
available to us.
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we repeat the policy experiment of the switch from exogenous to optimal
policy above by letting the government choose only the labour income taxes,
education subsidy and debt to maximise welfare for the economy, starting
from the exogenous steady-state. The steady-state results are summarised
in Table 4 and the optimal transition path in Figure 4.
Table 4: Exogenous and Optimal steady-states ( p=  e= 0:31)
Exogenous Optimal Exogenous Optimal
policy policy policy policy
Y 0.134 0.137 ws=wu 1.640 1.439
C 0.076 0.075 ws=wu 1.538 1.419
Kp 0.091 0.093  s 0.250 0.285
Ke 0.170 0.178 u 0.200 0.274
hs 0.118 0.128 sg 0.000 0.565
hu 0.148 0.133 b=Y 0.530 0.931
e 0.015 0.013 Gc=Y 0.238 0.234
Eg 0.002 0.005 U -76.438 -76.077
The results in Table 4 indicate that the labour income taxes remain op-
timally progressive in this case. However, the progressivity is lower because
a lower skilled relative to unskilled income tax, which acts to increase skilled
labour supply, also works to stimulate capital accumulation. The latter can-
not be increased in this case by reductions in the capital tax, which creates
incentives for the government to use labour income taxation to boost capital
accumulation.19 It is also interesting to note in Figure 4 that labour income
tax progressivity is signicantly higher in the short-run after the switch to
optimal policy, compared with the long-run, where it is relatively smaller.
This pattern reects the incentives of the government to partially use labour
income tax progressivity as a substitute for capital tax policy. In particular,
recall that capital taxes would optimally be at their lowest (i.e. zero) in the
long-run. For the same reasons, the subsidy for spending on goods for skill
acquisition is higher in Table 4 than in Table 3.
[Figure 4 here]
Further note that the lower labour income tax progressivity implies that
the pre- and post-tax skill premium are similar, hence wage inequality is
reduced in both gross and net of tax terms. The decrease in the pre-tax
skill premium is also consistent with the small increase in capital supply, in
19This is a result of the incompleteness of the tax policy menu, which implies that there
are more margins of choice than policy instruments.
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the face of an increase in the relative skill supply, compared with the case
where capital taxes are set to zero. Moreover, as the government is not able
to generate big surpluses in the rst period, because it cannot increase the
capital tax, optimal policy now implies debt, as opposed to assets, in the long-
run. Finally, given that this optimal policy problem is restricted compared
with the Ramsey problem analysed earlier, the welfare gains from the switch
to optimal policy are lower, amounting to a compensating consumption gain
of 1.343%.
5 Conclusions
To consider reforms of the public sector which will lead to an improvement in
the allocation of resources, this paper evaluated quantitatively the extent of
the progressivity of optimal labour income taxation, under skill heterogene-
ity, endogenous skill acquisition and a production sector characterised by
capital-skill complementarity. We isolated optimal taxation from incentives
for income redistribution by working with a representative agent framework
and considered the problem of a Ramsey planner, who had access to a com-
plete instrument set to minimise the distortions associated with taxation in
an economy with perfect capital and labour markets.
In this framework, the household decided how to allocate its expenditure
into investment in the two types of capital stock and into goods for creating
skilled labour. Moreover, it decided how to allocate its time endowment
into leisure, work time in skill and unskilled jobs, as well as in education
for creating skilled labour. The resource requirements associated with skill
acquisition in turn implied that there was a wage premium accruing to skilled
labour to compensate for these costs.
We found that wage inequality in this setup implied progressive labour
income taxation, because the work time elasticity for skilled labour was lower
relative to that of unskilled. The resource implications for creating skilled
labour implied e¤ects on the skilled work time elasticity which were driven by
changes in the households disposable income and in its available total time.
These e¤ects worked to increase and decrease, respectively, the elasticity of
skilled work time with respect to the tax rate. When the model was calibrated
to U.S. data, the skilled work time elasticity was lower relative to that for
unskilled labour, thus leading to optimal progressive labour income taxes.
We further found that a reform that implements the Ramsey plan starting
from the current economy required that capital taxes were set very high
in the rst period and then rapidly decreased towards zero, as is common
in the literature on optimal capital taxation. Moreover, the government
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ran big surpluses in the rst period, which allowed it to create a stock of
assets, which were in turn used to nance primary decits in the future. The
changes in taxation along the optimal path implied a sharp increase in wage
inequality in the rst periods, before the skill premium returned e¤ectively
to its initial level. However, since the tax system became progressive from
the rst period, net wage inequality was reduced under Ramsey policy over
the entire transition path.
We next found that when the capital taxes were xed, optimal policy
still implied progressive labour taxes but less so than when a complete in-
strument set was available to the government. Without the ability to change
capital taxes, the tax rate on skilled labour, due to its complementarity with
equipment capital, needs to fall to encourage capital accumulation. Finally,
wage inequality is reduced in both gross and net of tax terms.
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6 Appendix
6.1 DCE system of equations
Given initial conditions for capital and debt and the transversality conditions
in (18) - (19), the system of equations characterising the DCE can be written
as follows:
 Uhst
UCt
  (1   st )wst  
Uet
UCtget
= 0 (58)
 Uhut
UCt
  (1  ut )wut = 0 (59)
  Uet
UC;t
  (1  sgt )
get
gEgt
= 0 (60)
UCt
UCt+1
  rpt+1(1   pt+1)  (1  p) = 0 (61)
UCt
UCt+1
  ret+1(1   et+1)  (1  e) = 0 (62)
UCt
UCt+1
 Rbt = 0 (63)
wst   fehst = 0 (64)
wut   fehut = 0 (65)
rpt   f eKt = 0 (66)
ret   f eKet = 0 (67)
Gct + s
g
tE
g
t + bt    st wsthst   ut wut hut    pt rptKpt    et retKet  
bt+1
Rbt
= 0 (68)
Yt  Gc   Ct   Ipt   Iet   Egt = 0. (69)
Note that in the above representation, the Lagrange multipliers t, and
Mt have been substituted using the appropriate rst-order conditions of the
household.
28
6.2 First order conditions of optimal policy
The rst order conditions for the governments problem are:
 for t = 0:
Vhs0 =  (VC0   AC)Yhs0   0 + Ahs (70)
Vhu0 =  (VC0   AC)Yhu0 + Ahu (71)
Ve0 = 0ge0 + Ae (72)
VEg0 = 0gE
g
0
+ VC0   AC (73)
VC0   AC = VC1

YKp1 + 1  p

(74)
VC0   AC = VC1

YKe1 + 1  e

(75)
Y0 = G
c + C0 + I
p
0 + I
e
0 + E
g
0 (76)
hs0 = g(E
g
0 ; e0) (77)
 for t = 1; 2; 3:::T   1:
Vhst =  VCtYhst   t (78)
Vhut =  VCtYhut (79)
Vet = tget (80)
VEgt = tgE
g
t
+ VCt (81)
VCt = VCt+1
h
YKpt+1 + 1  p
i
(82)
VCt = VCt+1
h
YKet+1 + 1  e
i
(83)
Yt = G
c + Ct + I
p
t + I
e
t + E
g
t (84)
hst = g(E
g
t ; et) (85)
 for t = T :
VhsT =  VCTYhsT   T (86)
VhuT =  VCTYhuT (87)
VeT = TgeT (88)
VEgT = TgE
g
T
+ VCT (89)
1 = 
h
YKpT + 1  p
i
(90)
1 = 

YKeT + 1  e

(91)
YT = G
c + CT + I
p
T + I
e
T + E
g
T (92)
hsT = g(E
g
T ; eT ) (93)
29
6.3 Data sources for calibration
Table 5: Data Sources
Variable Source
Skilled to unskilled labour ratio Acemoglu and Autor (2011)
Skill premium U.S. Census Bureau
Capital to output ratio U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
Real rate of return on capital World Bank Indicators
Education Invest. to output ratio U.S. Digest of Education Statistics
College educated share U.S. Census Bureau
Labour and capital tax rates Constructed following Martinez-Mongay (2000) using ECFIN data
Debt to output ratio Federal Reserve Economic Data
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